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ACCOUNTABLE MANAGED CARE: SHOULD WE
BE CAREFUL WHAT WE WISH FOR?
David A. Hyman*
Managed care is exceedingly unpopular of late. Many people believe that the prob-
lem is managed care organizations (MCOs) are unaccountable. Indeed, for many
people, the creation of tort-based accountability for MCOs is the touchstone for as-
sessing legislative "reform." The case for tort-based accountability is actually quite
complex, and the merits of tort-based accountability cannot be resolved with sound
bites and bad anecdotes. Tort-based accountability has both costs and benefits,
and little attention has been paid to the extent to which alternatives to tort-based
accountability are found in existing institutional arrangements.
This Article systematically considers the extent to which alternatives to the tort
system have become widely accepted parts of the commercial landscape, and the
trade-offs associated with the use of the tort system to deliver accountability. The
Article concludes with ten suggestions for regulating managed care if the goal is
actually to improve the care provided.
It is very much as if one were to write an opinion which im-
plied that everyone had a natural law right to a Rolls Royce
and that an action in warranty would lie against all other
automobile manufacturers if they provided anything less ele-
gant. Many damage awards might follow, but eventually all
other automobile manufacturers would be out of business,
notwithstanding that very few Rolls Royces had come into the
hands of those whom the opinion was intended to help.'
INTRODUCTION
Managed care organizations (MCOs) may provide health care
services to the majority of insured Americans, but public acclaim
has lagged well behind market share. A flood of horror stories has
solidly implanted the perception that life under managed care is
nasty, brutish, and short. Although the specific complaints vary
greatly depending on which group is complaining, the dominant
* Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. B.A. 1983, University of Chicago;
J.D. 1989, University of Chicago Law School; M.D. 1991, University of Chicago. Bill Brew-
baker and Don Gifford provided helpful comments. As always, errors of omission and
commission are mine alone.
1. Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 133 (W. Va. 1978).
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theme is that MCOs are not accountable for their actions. Unac-
countability has become the sound bite for everything that is
supposedly wrong with managed care, and accountability is the
touchstone for assessing reforms. Little attention has been given to
the costs and benefits of accountability as such, and the extent to
which accountability in all its various manifestations is found in
existing institutional arrangements.
Part I describes the common perception of an "accountability
crisis" in managed care, and outlines the legal framework within
which MCOs are regulated. Part II offers some observations on ac-
countability, including the extent to which alternatives to the tort
system have become widely accepted parts of the commercial land-
scape, and the trade-offs associated with the use of the tort system
to deliver accountability. Part III considers what implied warranties
of habitability, the bar admissions process, and shrink-wrap soft-
ware licenses can teach us about accountability. The Article
concludes with some suggestions for regulating managed care if
our goal is to improve the status quo.
I. THE ACCOUNTABILITY CRISIS
The common consensus about managed care is exceedingly nega-
tive. Newspaper columnists, providers, legislators and judges have
formed a Greek chorus condemning the misdeeds of MCOs.2 The
dominant theme of these commentaries is that managed care is not
accountable, and that legislation is necessary to redress that prob-
lem. The necessary implication is that the absence of accountability
is an unmitigated evil. Indeed, the purported absence of account-
ability has become the mantra of opponents of managed care,
justifying a flood of proposed "reforms" at the state and federal level,
bearing names such as the Promoting Responsible Managed Care
Act of 1999,3 the Patient Protection Act of 1999, 4 the Access to Qual-
ity Care Act of 1999, 5 the Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1999 (of
which there are four competing versions),6 and the like.'
2. See David A. Hyman, Consumer Protection in a Managed Care World: Should Consumers
Call 911?, 43 VILL. L. REv. 409, 409-18 (1998) [hereinafter Hyman, Call 911].
3. S. 374, 106th Cong. (1999).
4. H.R. 448, 106th Cong. (1999).
5. H.R. 216, 106th Cong. (1999).
6. S. 6, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 240, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 300, 106th Cong. (1999);
S. 326, 106th Cong. (1999).
7. SeeHyman, Call 911, supra note 2, at 419 (collecting titles of proposed bills).
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So is managed care accountable or not? To some extent, the an-
swer depends on what one means by "accountable." The American
Association of Health Plans has created a wonderful eighteen by
twenty-four inch seven-color chart which demonstrates (with com-
plexity worthy of a Rube Goldberg drawing) all of the different
entities with regulatory authority over MCOs and those with whom
the MCOs contract! In addition, MCOs must come to terms with a
host of other parties-including vendors, purchasers, and stock-
holders. Thus, if unaccountable is intended to imply that MCOs do
not have to answer to anyone, the claim is false from both a posi-
tive and normative perspective.
There is, however, an important sense in which MCOs are unac-
countable, if one treats susceptibility to state regulation and tort
actions as a synonym for accountability. In order to understand the
issue, it is necessary to briefly review two federal statutes: the
McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA), 9 and the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA). 1o The MFA delegates primary
authority to the states to regulate insurance. The states have en-
thusiastically taken up the challenge and aggressively regulated the
terms on which health insurance may be offered. Thus, insurers
are required to cover certain services, and to provide specified
mechanisms for appeals and dispute resolution and the like. 12 State
courts have also developed and deployed the doctrine of bad faith
refusal to pay in order to encourage insurers to deliver promised
services. 3 This doctrine has allowed some plaintiffs to secure eye-
popping punitive damage verdicts against insurers and MCOs in
cases where these entities have refused to cover what they have de-
termined are experimental or unnecessary medical treatments. 1
For the 150 million Americans who secure their health care cov-
erage through an employee benefit plan, and receive a substantial
tax subsidy for doing so, ERISA carves out of the MFA two large
8. See American Association of Health Plans, Chart: Summary of Health Plan Regulation
(visited Sept. 9, 1999) <http://www.aahp.org/menus/index.cfin?CFID=155914&CFTOKEN-
41060903>.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1945).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1974).
11. See ROBERT JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 58 (1996) ("In essence, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act gave supremacy to state regulation of the business of insurance to
the extent the states chose to occupy the regulatory field.").
12. See id. at 93-94, 437-39.
13. See id. at 151-62.
14. See Hyman, Call 911, supra note 2, at 411 n.8. Recently, a jury imposed punitive
damages of $116 million for Aetna's refusal to cover a bone marrow transplant for a patient
with stomach cancer. See Nancy Ann Jeffrey & Ron Winslow, Aetna Told to Pay $116 Million
Damages, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 21, 1999, at A4.
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exceptions.' State laws that apply to employee benefit plans are
subject to a broad preemption provision, although these laws can
be "saved" from preemption.'6 ERISA also specifies a limited array
of options for enforcing its provisions. In general, lawsuits against
an employee benefit plan are limited to the value of the denied
services, and certain claims are simply preempted.
17
Thus, the answer to the question "is managed care unaccount-
able?" depends a great deal on what one means by accountability.
If one views susceptibility to the tort system as equivalent to ac-
countability, then large portions of the managed care market are
largely unaccountable. If one considers susceptibility to state regu-
lation as the equivalent of accountability, the market falls closer to
the accountability end of the spectrum, but still falls well short of
15. See Employee Benefit Research Institute, Preliminary EBRIHCS Findings: EBRI Survey
Examines Americans' Confidence in the Health Care System (visited Sept. 13, 1999) <http://
www.ebri.org/prrel/pr493.htm> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
("Two-thirds of all those under age 65, amounting to 151.7 million Americans, get their
health coverage through depend [sic] on employment-based health coverage."). On the tax
subsidy for such coverage, see I.R.C. § 106 (1994) ("Gross income of an employee does not
include employer-provided coverage under an accident or health plan."). The value of this
subsidy is estimated at $76.2 billion per year in fiscal year 1999. See David A. Hyman, Drive-
Through Deliveries: Is "Consumer Protection "Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 78 N.C. L. REv. 5, 11
n.28 (1999) [hereinafter Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries].
16. See generally Shaw v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Wendy K. Mariner,
State Regulation of Managed Care and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 335 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1986 (1996). The extent of this "savings" is quite restricted for the 50 million Ameri-
cans in self-funded employee benefit plans, although the boundaries remain in dispute.
Compare Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (finding state men-
tal health care mandate applicable only to non-self-funded employee benefit plans) with
Prudential Ins. Co. v. National Park Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding pre-
emption of Arkansas Patient Protection Act, and noting "[t]he precise scope of ERISA
preemption of state law has left courts, including the Supreme Court, deeply troubled"),
'Washington Physicians Servs. Ass'n v. Gregoire, 147 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no
preemption of Washington Alternative Provider Statute), and Texas Pharmacy Ass'n v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 1035, 1038 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding preemption of Texas any-
willing-provider law).
17. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). Potential state tort actions
that may be preempted include vicarious liability for medical malpractice, direct liability for
utilization review, negligent selection and credentialing of providers, and the use of inap-
propriate incentive programs to contain costs. See Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret,
Form, Function and Managed Care Torts: Achieving Fairness and Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence, 35
Hous. L. REv. 985, 1060-70 (1998). However, the precise boundaries of preemption remain
a matter of hot dispute; some courts have attempted to employ a quality/quantity distinction
to allow certain suits to proceed. See, e.g., Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir.
1995) (finding no preemption of state common-law claims); Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 52-53 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding preemption of state common-law
claims); Stuart Auerbach, Law Guarding HMOsfrom Suit Challenged; Patients Find Doctors Easier
to Sue, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1996, at Z8. For an interesting article arguing that MCOs
should be deemed to offer an implied warranty of quality to subscribers, see William S.
Brewbaker, Medical Malpractice and Managed Care Organizations: The Implied Warranty of Qual-
ity, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter & Spring 1997, at 117.
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full accountability."' Part II explores whether this deviation from
full tort-based accountability is consistent with existing institutional
arrangements in other sectors of the economy.
II. ACCOUNTABILITY: WHO NEEDS IT?
Efforts to bring tort-based accountability to managed care have
been positioned as a motherhood and apple-pie campaign, but the
issue is actually quite complex. Part II explores the practical and
theoretical issues raised by accountability, and the implications of
treating the tort system as necessary and sufficient to deliver the
same. The section is organized around ten reasons why tort-based
accountability is overrated.
At the outset, it is important that the case against tort-based ac-
coun'tability for managed care not be overstated. Even if one does
not believe that health care is so "special" that government should
provide it (or at least pay for it), it certainly does not follow that
the health care market is perfectly competitive, or that it provides
services with the appropriate mix of cost and quality, let alone does
so in a fashion that is consumer-friendly."' Indeed, health care is
everyone's favorite example of market failure in action. Aggrega-
tion of coverage at the employer level may have helped solve one
set of problems (bounded rationality, adverse selection), but it has
clearly created others (portability, constrained coverage choice,
and perceived unresponsiveness) .20 No less a market-oriented
18. The combination of ERISA and the MFA substantially restricts the ability of state
legislatures to regulate the health care coverage offered to citizens of the state, and those
who receive such care within the state's borders. For example, an individual could live in
state A, secure insurance through his job in state B, and receive health care in state C, but
only state B's laws would govern the insurance contract-unless, of course, coverage was
secured from a self-funded employee benefit plan, in which case none of the states would
have regulatory authority. The net result is that state insurance departments regulate about
one-third of the health insurance coverage in an average state. See Mariner, supra note 16, at
1987. Even when state regulation could encompass a particular population, it does not fol-
low that it will-especially if the costs of the regulation are on-budget. See Hyman, Drive-
Through Deliveries, supra note 15, at 26 (noting that a majority of states excluded Medicaid
beneficiaries and state employees from scope of drive-through delivery statutes).
19. With regard to quality, it is clear that American medicine is marked by a consider-
able degree of variation in quality without regard to cost. See Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries,
supra note 15, at 26. In like fashion, the quality of service leaves much to be desired. SeeJohn
W. Kenagy et al., Service Quality in Health Care, 281 JAMA 661 (1999) (analyzing health care
delivery from a service quality point of view, and finding it woefully inadequate).
20. See David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What's Wrong with a Patient Bill of
Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) [hereinafter Hyman, What's Wrong with a
Patient Bill of Rights].
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authority than Professor Clark Havighurst has declared that the
efforts of tort lawyers should be harnessed to encourage MCOs to
step up to the plate and take responsibility for the quality of care
provided by those with whom they contract.21 A little tort liability
might well be helpful in focusing everyone's attention on what pa-
tients actually desire.
However, the issue cannot be resolved at the level of a blanket
statement that accountability/tort liability is good, and the absence
of accountability/tort liability is evil. A balanced assessment must
consider both the costs and benefits of accountability, and the ex-
tent to which alternatives to the tort system provide a different
form of accountability at lower cost. Unfortunately, the debate over
accountability/tort liability has become completely polarized, with
each side insisting that its preferred approach is absolutely re-
quired to prevent low quality medical care on the one hand, and
the complete destruction of managed care on the other.22 This Ar-
ticle charts a different course by exploring the implications of
viewing the tort system as a synonym for accountability when alter-
native institutional arrangements are available.
Let me start with a home-spun (pun intended) example. I buy
lots of clothing from Lands' End. As a purchaser of goods, I have
certain legal rights which I can enforce with a lawsuit. In my deal-
ings with Lands' End, I don't attach any importance to these legal
rights, and I suspect neither does Lands' End. Instead, Lands' End
has decided the best way to get me to buy things from them is to
offer me an ironclad guarantee. If I am ever unhappy with any
Lands' End product for any reason or no reason, I just send it
back, and they either refund my money or send me a replacement,
no questions asked.3
21. See Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health Plans Accountable for the Quality of Care, 31
GA. L. REv. 587, 589 (1997).
22. See Carol Marie Cropper, In Texas, a Laboratory Test on the Effects of Suing H.M.O. 's,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1998, § 3, at 3 ("To hear lobbyists and lawmakers in Washington tell it,
giving patients the right to sue insurers that refuse to approve medical treatment would be
either the death of managed care or the salvation of patients.").
23. The text of this guarantee reads:
Guaranteed. Period.
The world is full of guarantees, no two alike. As a rule, the more words they contain,
the more their protection is limited. The Lands' End guarantee has always been an
unconditional one. It reads: "If you are not completely satisfied with any item you buy
from us, at any time during your use of it, return it and we will refund your full pur-
chase price."
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The guarantee far exceeds the rights provided to me as a pur-
chaser of goods, and I need not resort to the legal system to
vindicate my interests. To be sure, both Lands' End and I are bar-
gaining in the shadow of the law, but both ex ante and ex post, I rely
on the reputation of Lands' End for fair dealing far more than on
what I anticipate the results would be if I retained counsel and
24proceeded to court. Lawyers and judges may find it comforting to
believe that legal rights are both necessary and sufficient to ensure
accountability, but that perspective is a self-aggrandizing fantasy;
for both consumers and vendors, alternative institutional arrange-
ments are often a far more cost-effective way of accomplishing
their mutual objectives, including (but by no means limited to) the
appropriate quantum of accountability.
25
Second, the absence of legal accountability does not necessarily
mean that one party will take advantage of the other, or otherwise
behave inappropriately, no matter how one chooses to define
those terms. In any continuing relationship involving mutual gain,
the parties are likely to act cooperatively, and prefer informal
norms to whatever the law has to say about the matter. The fact
that there is law on the subject does not mean the "legal" outcome
is necessarily better, let alone optimal. As Grant Gilmore noted,
"[iln Heaven there will be no law, and the lion will lie down with
the lamb .... In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due proc-
ess will be meticulously observed.,
26
Indeed, there are many examples of markets in which the par-
ties routinely go well beyond what the law requires, to the mutual
benefit of all. Consider the market for real estate leaseholds as out-
lined by Richard Epstein:
We mean every word of it. Whatever. Whenever. Always. But to make sure this is per-
fectly clear, we've decided to simplify it further.
GUARANTEED. PERIOD.®
Lands' End, Guaranteed. Period. (visited Sept. 13, 1999) <http://www.landsend.com/
spawn.cgi?sid=0947538557620&target=EDITGUARXXXX&refer=NODECOMP0795&mode=
GRAPHIC> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
24. Cf Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979) (discussing "the impact of the legal system
on negotiations and bargaining that occur outside the courtroom").
25. Whether reputation can have the same impact in a market where individual choice
and exit are constrained is a more complex question. It is important to recognize, however,
that even if reputation is a less significant impediment to opportunistic behavior in such a
market, a different solution to the accountability problem could well disrupt the equilibrium
solution to different and more severe problems, such as cost and adverse selection.
26. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 111 (1977).
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[T] he pattern of legal opposition and social compliance is a
common one, and there are good reasons for it.... When my
wife and I moved to Chicago in 1972 we rented a two-
bedroom apartment in a new high-rise that was then only
partly rented. As a young law professor I did something that I
might not do today: I read the lease. In doing so, I discovered
that the landlord assumed no obligations for repairs of dam-
age that took place inside the units. But I also noted that the
building had a full-time maintenance staff at the beck and call
of the tenants. I asked the rental agent to explain the differ-
ence between the tough talk in the lease and the prompt
service in the building-even then I knew it was better than
the reverse situation of a promise of service with no mainte-
nance staff.
Her answer made perfectly good sense. The building owners
knew that reputation matters in attracting and keeping
tenants in a building, but they drafted the lease such that they
could have control, without judicial intervention, of any bad-
apple tenant whom they distrusted. Should they have to
demonstrate to an independent third party that they were in
compliance with some "for cause" norm for withholding
repair services, they could easily fail. The private knowledge
that they had about the behavior of tenants, the conditions of
the units, and the source of the damage easily could be lost in
translation, and they would lose control over their own
operations. Furthermore, if good tenants left because bad
tenants stayed, then the whole building could fall into
disarray. Knowing that the landlord had the tools to protect
us from neighboring tenants who might otherwise make life
unpleasant, my wife and I eagerly signed the lease, and the
two years we lived there repaid our confidence. The legal risk
that the landlord might deny its obligation to repair never
27came to pass....
As a long-time lessee, and short-time lessor of property in Hyde
Park, I can confirm that this pattern continued well into the 1990s.
Indeed, the pattern of "tough talk" in the lease and "prompt main-
tenance" in the building appears to prevail (and work without
difficulty) in most locations, unless rent control and other forms of
27. Richard A. Epstein, Why Is This Man a Moderate, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1758, 1761-62
(1996).
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housing regulation have disturbed the equilibrium of mutual ad-
vantage through exchange. 8
Third, if legal accountability through the tort system is such a
wonderful default term, how does one explain the widespread en-
thusiasm for limiting or eliminating access to the tort system
through "tort reform?" Many states have passed "tort reform'.' legis-
lation. 9 Congress recently enacted laws restricting tort liability for
biomaterials manufacturers and volunteers.3 0 These steps would
not be necessary if legislators and the public had confidence in the
performance of the tort system.
More significantly, those most directly affected by the tort
system have concluded it is in their best interests to contract out
of it. A wide variety of firms are embracing mandatory arbitration
clauses in their consumer contracts, and pledging to pursuemediation for all commercial disputes. Auto choice and
28. See Robert C. Ellickson, Rent Control: A Comment on Olsen, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 947,
949 (1991) ("Rent control ... tends to lock landlords and tenants into continuing uncoop-
erative relationships .... By keeping mutual antagonists in the same cage, rent control
breeds nastiness in landlord-tenant interactions."); John Tierney, At the Intersection of Supply
and Demand, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1997, § 6 (Magazine), at 42 (analyzing the destructive con-
sequences of rent control and housing regulation on landlord-tenant relationships).
29. See American Tort Reform Association, 1999 State Tort Reform Enactments (last modi-
fied Nov. 17, 1999) <http://www.atra.org/enact/99june.htm> (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (listing tort reform legislation passed by 13 states in the first
six months of 1999).
30. See, e.g., Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1606 (1999);
Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501-14505 (1999).
31. See Stephanie Armour, Consumers in Bind? USA TODAY, Nov. 27, 1998, at B6
("Some consumers with disputes are finding they may be barred from taking claims to court.
Instead, they are required to take complaints to mandatory arbitration. The clause is crop-
ping up in agreements drafted by banks, brokers, health plans, insurance providers and a
host of other firms."); Christine Dugas, Arbitration Might Be Only Choice, USA TODAY, Aug. 27,
1999, at B3 (noting increasing use of arbitration clauses by banks and credit card issuers).
Indeed, one of my students recently told me that his telephone bill included an arbitration
clause!
32. See Margaret A. Jacobs, Industry Giants Join Movement to Mediate, WALL ST. J.,July 21,
1997, at BI. The article notes:
While the vow to mediate only applies to disputes with other companies that have
signed on, the agreements cover everything from false advertising and trademark
claims to suits to prevent executives from joining a competitor. The signers include
rivals in the nonprescription-drug and insurance industries, as well as food makers,
banks and chemical companies. Under a separate agreement, major franchisers have
committed to mediating disputes with their franchisees. And similar pacts are being
negotiated in aviation, telecommunications and computers.
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alternative dispute resolution have attracted the interest of
everyone except trial lawyers.33
My personal experiences as a consumer confirm these trends.
When I go skiing, the lift ticket contains a near-absolute waiver of
liability, coupled with choice of forum and choice of law clauses
forcing me to bring suit on the ski area's home turf.34 In order to
rent ski equipment, I have to sign away all of my legal rights.35 If my
33. See Peter Passell, A Call For 'Auto Choice' and Lower Premiums, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30,
1998, § 3, at 1 (noting opposition of trial lawyers and some self-styled consumer advocates to
auto choice "which stands for a set of legal changes based on the idea of cutting premiums
by limiting the right to sue for damages").
34. The peel off wrapper on the pass warns in bold print and all capital letters as fol-
lows: "On this pass, please read the notice of inherent risks jurisdiction limitation and notice
of equipment on the slopes and unmarked obstacles. Ski in control." Ski Lift Ticket (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Both the pass and the area map contain
the following legend:
Notice-Inherent Risks of Skiing Act
No skier shall recover from a ski area operator for injuries resulting from any of the
inherent risks of skiing which means those dangers or conditions which are an inte-
gral part of skiing, including but not limited to:
1. Changing weather conditions
2. Variations or steepness in terrain
3. Snow or ice conditions
4. Surface or subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest growth,
rocks, and stumps
5. Impact with lift towers and other structures and their components
6. Collisions with other skiers
7. Failure to ski within your ability
If you cannot accept the inherent risks of skiing, please do not ski at this area.
By using this pass I agree that any litigation, arbitration or mediation that I or my
representative or family bring against Alta Ski Lifts Company shall be brought in Salt
Lake County, Utah and that the laws of the State of Utah shall be the applicable laws.
Be aware that snowmaking equipment, snowmobiles and snowcats may be on the
slopes at any time. Always ski in control! Unmarked obstacles may exist or present
themselves at any time.
Id.
35. On the front of the rental receipt, the following text appears in bold red letters: "I
HAVE READ THE RENTAL AGREEMENT ON THE BACK OF THIS FORM RELEASING
THE SHOP FROM LIABILITY. I VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THAT
STATEMENT." Ski Rental Agreement (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform). On the back, the following appears in smaller type:
RENTAL AGREEMENT
PLEASE READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING
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children wish to participate in an organized sport, I must sign a
detailed waiver and release.36 The local batting cages are posted
1. I accept for use as is the equipment listed on this form, and accept full
responsibility for the care of the equipment while it is in my possession.
2. I will be responsible for the replacement at full retail value of any
equipment rented under this form, but not returned to the shop.
3. I agree to return all rental equipment by the agreed date in clean con-
dition to avoid any additional charges.
4. I have received instruction on the use of my equipment and fully un-
derstand its use and function.
5. I have made no misrepresentations to the ski shop in regard to my
height, weight, age or skier type.
6. I verify that the visual indicators on my bindings correspond to the set-
tings as shown on this rental agreement form.
7. I agree to hold harmless and indemnify the ski shop and its owners,
agents and employees, as well as the equipment manufacturers and dis-
tributors for any loss or damage, including any that results from claims
for personal injury, death or property damage related to the use of the
equipment, except reasonable wear and tear.
8. I understand that there are inherent and other risks involved in the
sport for which this equipment is to be used, snow skiing, that injuries
are a common and ordinary occurrence of the sport, and I freely and
voluntarily assume those risks.
9. I understand that a ski-binding-boot system will not release at all times
or under all circumstances where release may prevent injury or death,
nor is it possible to predict every situation in which it will release, and
is, therefore, no guarantee of my safety.
10. I hereby release from any legal liability the ski shop and its owners,
agents and employees, as well as the equipment manufacturers and dis-
tributors of this equipment from any and all liability for damage and
injury or death to myself or to any person or property resulting from
the selection, installation, maintenance, adjustment or use of this
equipment, and for any claim based upon negligence, breach of war-
ranty, contract or other legal theory, accepting myself the full
responsibility for any and all such damage, injury or death which may
result.
11. This agreement is governed by the applicable law of the state or prov-
ince. If any part of this agreement is determined to be unenforceable,
all other parts shall be given full force and effect.
Id.
36. While I was writing this Article, my son asked if he could join a recreational la-
crosse league. The waiver and release states:
I am fully aware of and appreciate the risks, including the risk of catastrophic injury,
paralysis, and even death, as well as other damages and losses associated with partici-
pation in a lacrosse event. I further agree on behalf of myself, my heirs, and personal
representatives that US Lacrosse, the host organization, and sponsors of any US La-
crosse sanctioned event, along with the coaches, volunteers, employees, agents,
officers and directors of these organizations, shall not be liable for any injury, loss of
life or other loss or damage occurring as a result of my participation in the event.
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with a large sign warning of its perils. The roller rink contains a
large sign warning of the perils of falling and collisions, and dis-
38
claiming responsibility for the same.
What of the home of American justice, the Supreme Court,
whose facade bears the legend "Equal Justice Under Law"? Visitors
entering the building must deposit their belongings in a locker
where a prominently posted sign warns that the Court assumes no
liability for the loss of anything that is placed in the locker. 9
If you build a better mousetrap, people will generally beat a path
to your door. What does the reluctance of well-informed market
participants (including, ironically enough, the Justices of the Su-
preme Court) to subject themselves to the tort system say about the
mousetrap that lawyers and judges have built? Claims about the
dictates of justice may sound inspirational,4° but they will not re-
verse the reluctance of those most involved to subject themselves to
the hazards of litigation-particularly when a single jury, inclined
to "send a message," can put them out of business. 4
Lacrosse Waiver (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). If participants
are under 18, their parent or guardian must "verify by my signature below that I fully under-
stand and accept each of the above conditions for permitting my child to participate in any
US Lacrosse sanctioned event." Id.
37. The sign reads as follows: "WARNING!! This Amusement Game involves a degree
of skill and of risk. All participants or spectators assume full responsibility for any injuries
incurred. The Management." For more information about this sign, please contact the
author.
38. The sign reads as follows:
Falling is a normal part of roller skating. Because of the normal risk of maintaining
balance on skates and the probability of occasional contact between skaters accidents
can and do happen. You must voluntarily assume the risks of injury when you skate.
By purchasing an admission or skate rental ticket, customer acknowledges and ac-
cepts this risk. Management is not responsible for accidents. We do not carry
insurance covering injury to skaters.
For more information about this sign, please contact the author.
39. The sign reads as follows: "Lockers are provided for your convenience. The Court
assumes no liability for loss." For more information about this sign, please contact the
author.
40. See, e.g., Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 52-53 (D. Mass.
1997) ("Consider just one of her claims-breach of contract. This cause of action ... pre-
dates Magna Carta. It is the very bedrock of our notion of individual autonomy and property
rights .... Our entire capitalist structure depends on it.").
41. To be sure, one's assessment of the tort system should not be based on anecdotes,
whether they are offered by its opponents or its enthusiasts. See David A. Hyman, Lies,
Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L. J. 797, 804-05 (1998) (juxtaposing anecdotal claims
made by opponents and supporters of the tort system). Of course, that goes for mandatory
arbitration as well. See Marc A. Rodwin, Backlash as Prelude to Managing Managed Care, 24 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1115, 1118 (1999) ("Consider [Engalla v. Permanente Medical
Group,] a case that reveals a systemic problem.").
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Fourth, when it comes to managed care, there is no evidence
indicating that the absence of legal accountability has had any ef-
fect on the quality or value of the medical services that are
provided.42 Indeed, given past performance, should we really ex-
pect the tort system to cost-effectively encourage high quality
managed care and penalize low-quality managed care? It is far
more likely that the tort system will perform erratically, sometimes
blessing low-quality managed care, and sometimes penalizing high
quality managed care, while simultaneously imposing a significant
loading cost on all managed care transactions and under-
compensating those who are most badly injured.43 Physicians have
consistently derided the ability ofjurors to resolve issues of medical
negligence, and argued that the tort system provides such a noisy
signal with regard to quality of care at such a high cost that it is
worse than nothing. Why have doctors suddenly become so enthu-
siastic about using the tort system to bring accountability to
managed care? Is it just that misery loves company?
Fifth, the imposition of legal accountability can have a profound
impact on the underlying institutional arrangements-with results
not necessarily anticipated by those lobbying for such protections.
At present, the simple phrase "managed care" encompasses a wide
array of entities employing a diverse set of incentive structures. The
financing and delivery of care can be integrated to a greater or
lesser extent; the corporate structure can be non-profit or for-
profit; providers can be employees of the managed care organiza-
tion or independent contractors; and providers can be selected
and compensated and the risks shared in a wide variety of ways.
The predictable adaptive response by a health plan to the imposi-
tion of legal accountability for quality of care is to sharply constrain
the number of providers a patient can see, screen them more care-
fully, and micro manage their work so as to more closely supervise
the care individual patients receive.44 It is hard to believe that pa-
tients and doctors will be enthusiastic about that result, when the
pressure for "consumer protection" derives from the erosion of
free choice regarding such matters."
42. See Hyman, What's Wrong with a Patient Bill of Rights, supra note 20.
43. See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE 75 (1993) ("Malpractice
litigation appears, then, to be sending as confusing a signal as would our traffic laws if the
police regularly gave out more tickets to drivers who go through green lights than to those
who go through red lights.").
44. See Michael Weinstein, In Health Care, Be Careful What You Wish For, N.Y. TIMES, May
31, 1998, § 4, at 1.
45. To be sure, there are compelling arguments that what is actually going on is pro-
vider protection. See Hyman, Call 911, supra note 2, at 425 n.63.
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Sixth, it is useful to consider the institutional arrangements and
practices which prevail in government-operated health care pro-
grams. Congress has quite deliberately insulated broad aspects of
the Medicare program from judicial review. 6 In a recent case, the
Department of Justice unflinchingly defended the Secretary of
Health & Human Services' handling of the Medicare managed
care program, even though the district court found that the Secre-
tary had failed to "implement and enforce effective notice,
hearing, and appeals procedures for HMO service denials."47 The
district court entered an injunction which was affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit, but the Supreme Court vacated, and instructed the
Ninth Circuit to reconsider its judgment in light of a more recent
Supreme Court decision holding that a private actor administering
an insurance plan whose existence was mandated by the state was
not subject to the due process requirements which would bind the
government if it ran the program itself.48 If these deviations from
full accountability and effective notice, hearing, and appeals pro-
cedures are good enough for governmental health plans, why are
they not good enough for the private market?
Seventh, if tort-based accountability is such a wonderful thing,
why have lawyers been completely unwilling to insist on it among
their own ranks? Only one state requires lawyers to purchase mal-
practice insurance. 49 The best available figures indicate that as
many as fifty-five percent of lawyers have chosen to "go bare," with
the percentage much higher among solo practitioners and small
firms.50 Absent such insurance, a malpractice case against a lawyer
will simply not be brought.5'
46. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(h), 1395hh(a)(2) (1994).
47. Shalala v. Grijalva, 946 F. Supp. 747, 747 (D. Az. 1996), affd, 152 F.3d 1115, 1120
(9th Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded for further consideration, 119 S. Ct. 1573 (1999). Indeed,
the plaintiffs alleged the Secretary had abdicated "her responsibility to monitor HMOs and
to ensure that HMOs provide Medicare covered benefits." Id.
48. See Grijalva v. Shalala, 119 S. Ct. 1573 (1999) (citing American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999)). In its order, the Court also instructed the Ninth Circuit to
consider the significance of Sections 4001 and 4002 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 275-330, which directed the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to issue certain regulations. See id.
49. See David A. Hyman, Professional Responsibility, Legal Malpractice and the Eternal Trian-
gle: Will Lawyers or Insurers Call the Shots?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 353, 370 (1997) ("Although
reformers have frequently proposed that state bars should mandate the purchase of mal-
practice insurance, only Oregon has succeeded in imposing this requirement.").
50. See id. at 369-70 ("Although estimates vary somewhat, the conventional wisdom is
that between 25%-55% of lawyers have chosen to 'go bare.' These averages mask a distinct
distributional skew: lawyers in solo practice and small firms are overwhelmingly unin-
sured.").
51. See Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Laryers and Law Professors, 70
TUL. L. REv. 2583, 2613 (1996) ("[S]olo practitioners, earning only $35,730 a year, who are
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What about accountability among law professors? The last time I
checked, grades were effectively unreviewable, whether through
the tort system or otherwise. Although some students seem to be-
lieve that grades may be appealed to the associate dean, that is, of
course, a fallacy. 2 None of the legal scholars who have written so
eloquently about the need for bringing accountability to managed
care through the tort system have volunteered the same solution
for dealing with their personal lack of accountability in the assign-
ment of grades.
Why limit ourselves to grades? How is the institution of tenure
consistent with the desire for accountability when it comes to
teaching and research? 3 In the view of many, tenure is the major
impediment to faculty accountability. 54 Attempts to create such ac-
countability through post-tenure review have been opposed by
tenured faculty and the American Association of University Profes-
sors.55 Indeed, the efforts of the University of Minnesota to
unilaterally impose post-tenure review triggered a unionization
56drive. Maybe we should ladle some sauce on the lawyer and law
professor-accountability goose at the same time we are basting the
MCO-accountability gander.57
probably supporting families, living from receivable to receivable, knowing enough about
creditor and bankruptcy laws to shelter assets, quickly recognize that for the same reason
that they would not sue an uninsured motorist, plaintiffs' legal malpractice lawyers will not
sue them if they are uninsured.").
52. SeeDaniel Keating, Ten Myths About Law School Grading, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 171,175-
76 (1998).
53. Those who wonder how tenure is viewed by those who do not have it should con-
sider the card game, Survival of the Witless, which defines tenure as "'the key to fame,
wealth, happiness and most importantly, to never having to put in a single day's work
again.'" Denise K. Magner, Play Your Cards Right and You, Too, Can Earn Tenure, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 11, 1998, at A16. To secure tenure, the candidate must draw cards
showing they have published a book and garnered sufficient status to insure a favorable
review committee vote. See id. However, "[dirawing the 'Lousy Teaching' card ... has no
effect on a tenure bid." Id.
54. See, e.g., Richard A. Matasar, A Commercialist Manifesto: Entrepreneurs, Academics, and
Purity of the Heart and Soul, 48 FLA. L. REV. 781, 810 (1996) ("Many schools have already
faced productivity assessments, hourly time sheets, cries for abolition of tenure, imposition
of post-tenure review, and demands for accountability."); David Leonhardt, Tenure: An Idea
Whose Time Has Gone, Bus. WK., Oct. 21, 1996, at 130 ("Many see tenure ... as an outdated
system that drives up costs and lessens accountability.").
55. See Ira P. Robbins, Exploring the Concept of Post-Tenure Review in Law Schools, 9 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REv. 387, 388-91 (1998).
56. See Fred. L. Morrison, Tenure Wars: An Account of the Controversy at Minnesota, 47 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 369, 371 (1997) (describing the formation of a union organization committee
as one consequence of the proposed changes in tenure regulations, which included post-
tenure review); Rene Sanchez, Minnesota Faculty, Regents Put Tenure to the Test, WASH. POST,
Nov. 9, 1996, at Al.
57. Those who demur from this suggestion should explain why they are not respond-
ing in the manner predicted by Professor Herbert Wechsler in a spectacularly mixed
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What about the tenure protections accorded federal judges? Ar-
ticle III of the Constitution quite deliberately creates a structure in
which traditional forms of accountability are completely absent.
8
Predictably enough, some judges have behaved badly-although
with extraordinarily rare exceptions, not badly enough to justify
their removal from the bench.5 9 As yet, I have not heard any pro-
posals to bring accountability to the federal judiciary by allowing
unhappy litigants to sue their judge. Indeed, engaging in such
conduct is a good way to be labeled a vexatious litigant, and limited
in one's ability to file further lawsuits. 60 As long as we are discussing
accountability, let us not forget diplomatic immunity, sovereign
immunity, the limitations on tort liability created by the First and
Eleventh Amendments to the Constitution, and the limited to
nonexistent circumstances in which an ordinary citizen can sue a
state or federal employee for failings in their official capacity. Does
anyone really believe the country would be better off if we
scrapped these limitations on the tort system?
61
metaphor: "What's sauce for the goose depends on whose ox is being gored." Proceedings of
the Fifty-Third Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 145 F.R.D. 149, 180
(1992).
58. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1 (providing that federal judges shall have lifetime
tenure so long as they demonstrate "good Behaviour," and their compensation "shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office").
59. To date, approximately a dozen federal judges have been impeached, for conduct
ranging from bribery and perjury to persistent drunkenness. SeeJason J. Vicente, Impeach-
ment: A Constitutional Primer, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 117, 133 (1998) ("Over the course of
American history, the House of Representatives has impeached fifteen individuals, including
a President, twelve judges, a senator, and a cabinet member. The Senate has convicted seven
of the fifteen.") (footnotes omitted). Impeachable behavior does not appear to encompass a
judge's persistent refusal to figure out how the Supreme Court would decide a case, or at
least one judge on the Ninth Circuit would be in serious trouble. See David G. Savage, Getting
the High Court's Attention: Liberal Leaning 9th Circuit Is Often Reversed, A.B.A.J., Nov. 1997, at 46
(noting that Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit has said it is his job to uphold
the Constitution, not to predict how the Supreme Court will decide an issue); David M.
O'Brien, Reinhardt and the Supreme Court: This Time, It's Personal, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1996, at
M2.
60. Admittedly, this strategy appears to be a perfectly appropriate response to the suits
which have been brought. Consider the litigation practices of Mr. Martin-Trigona:
[Mr.] Martin-Trigona has over the years filed a substantial number of lawsuits of a
vexatious, frivolous and scandalous nature. He has been a persistent and calculating
litigator. There is a long trail of such actions commenced by him against federal and
state judges, bar examiners, public officials, public agencies, lawyers and individuals
who in one way or another had any relationship, directly or indirectly, to any matter
concerning him.
Martin-Trigona v. Brooks & Holtzman, 551 F. Supp. 1378, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
61. No picking and choosing, either. Most of my colleagues would happily scrap the
Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity, but would have a heart attack if similar
treatment were proposed for the First Amendment.
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Eighth, accountability is not a binary option which when se-
lected provides only benefits. Indeed, it is easy to build too much
accountability into a system. Accountability may deter some "bad"
behavior, but it will predictably lead to the deterring of some
"good" behavior as well, as risk-averse decisionmakers decide the
potential gain is not worth the risk of being second-guessed byju-
rors subject to hindsight bias.62 Although the precise location of
the equilibrium point (and the dynamics of the underlying trade-
offs) will predictably vary across different transactions, at some
point, the gains from deterring "bad" behavior are swamped by the
costs of over-deterring "good" behavior.63
Behavioral research similarly indicates that accountability has
both good and bad effects:
A decision-maker who expects to be evaluated is likely to en-
gage in a more careful search of information and alternatives,
with a view-perhaps conscious, perhaps not-toward improv-
ing the chances that she will be favorably evaluated at the
appropriate time. Many common cognitive biases, including
the tendency toward overconfidence and the availabil-
ity/representativeness heuristics, are reduced or eliminated.
On the other hand, there is evidence that the ultimate quality
of the decision sometimes suffers because of accountability.
Actors may overload in their information searches, for in-
stance, thus diluting the effect of the most important
evidence. Or, too much attention to what others might think
can distort the process of inference, given the difficulty of
making thatjudgment.64
In short, when it comes to accountability, we should be careful how
much we wish for.
Ninth, accountability is being used as a stalking horse by groups
with considerably less public-spirited objectives. The medical pro-
fession wants to regain its ability to dictate the terms of trade with
regard to cost and quality. States wish to tap a new revenue source
by regulating a larger share of the health insurance market. The
62. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1525-26 (1998).
63. The point has long since been passed in health care, if the reaction of physicians
to the threat of legal liability is any guide. See generally MARSHALL B. KAPP, OUR HANDS ARE
TIED 27 (1998) ("Physicians almost uniformly perceive the behavior caused by their legal
apprehensions as negative on the quality of patient care.").
64. Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Law-
yers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 426-27 (1997).
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plaintiffs' bar is in search of additional defendants. Each of these
groups has a predictable and self-interested incentive to dismiss the
merits of the status quo, and offer their chosen terms of trade as a
solution without collateral costs. Of course, this tactic is not unique
to those involved in this debate; one's view of how the world
should work has a remarkable tendency to coincide with the terms
65of trade that one finds personally advantageous.
Finally, given the choice between unaccountable but affordable
insurance coverage and accountable insurance coverage which is
unaffordable for some percentage of those currently insured, why
are we so quick to conclude that the latter should be not just the
default term, but a mandatory minimum? As the Supreme Court
observed in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, ERISA sets "forth a
comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful
balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement pro-
cedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of
employee benefit plans., 66 Once we insist that health care coverage
must be bundled with legal accountability, we will predictably close
down the low end of the market.67 Perhaps that result accords with
65. See, e.g., Rebecca Buckman, Merrill Says Online Trading Is Bad for Investors, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 23, 1998, at CI (noting that a representative of Merrill Lynch has attacked Internet-
based discount stock trading because it "encourages people to trade too much at the ex-
pense of long-term returns," but "[slome industry experts contend Merrill is attacking
Internet trading simply because it fears the lower-cost trading mechanism could threaten its
'full-service,' higher commission business").
The issue is not limited to commercial competition, but is well-known in legal academic
circles. Cf Stewart Macaulay, Frank Remington: Defining the Law Professor's Job, 1992 Wis. L.
REV. 553, 556 (1992) ("I've defined 'The Wisconsin Idea' as: 'it ain't good but its [sic]
cheap!' "); Mary Helen McNeal, Redefining Attorney-Client Roles: Unbundling and Moderate-
Income Elderly Clients, 32 WARE FOREST L. REv. 295, 301, 301 n.32 (1997) (cataloging con-
cerns about providing unbundled legal services, and noting that "some of my concerns
about unbundling reflect my personal beliefs about how I want to conduct my professional
life").
66. 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).
67. To be sure, there are widely varying estimates scoring the cost of accountable man-
aged care. See, e.g., Jonathan Cohn, Managed Careless, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 16, 1998, at 6
("Citing a study by the accounting firm of Muse and Associates, reformers say Norwood's bill
[the Patient Access to Responsible Care Act, H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997)] would increase
premiums by, at most, 2.6 percent; their opponents, pulling out a study they commissioned
from Milliman and Robertson, say the increase could top 22 percent."); Amy Goldstein &
Helen Dewar, Health Care Bill's Price Debated: CBO Says Democratic Plan Would Hike Premiums
4%; GOP Differs, WASH. PosT, July 17, 1998, at A7 (finding considerable variation in esti-
mated costs of consumer protection bills).
Unfortunately, most estimates do not rise much beyond the level of educated guesswork.
Even if MCOs are made subject to tort liability, it is not clear how many lawsuits will be
brought or how they will come out, let alone whether MCOs will start to practice "defensive
coverage," and how elastic the demand is for health care coverage. The available empirical
evidence is not sufficient to resolve these matters. See David M. Studdert et al., Expanded
Managed Care Liability: What Impact on Employer Coverage, HEALTH AFF., Nov./Dec. 1999, at 7.
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our ethical sensibilities, but it is cold comfort to those who must
now choose between nothing but the best and nothing.68
To summarize, tort liability is one way of delivering accountabil-
ity, but it is not the only way of doing so. Lots of people believe that
the tort system causes more problems than it solves, if their efforts
to avoid it are any indication. Alternative institutional arrange-
ments are quite common, even in health plans run by the
government. The current performance of the tort system also
leaves much to be desired, especially if one is depending on it to
address quality of care issues. In short, the case for increased tort
liability against MCOs cannot be resolved simply by deploying the
symbolic claim that accountability is a good thing, and there
should be more of it.
III. WHAT CAN WE LEARN ABOUT ACCOUNTABILITY FROM
TENANTS' RIGHTS LITIGATION, BAR ADMISSIONS,
AND SHRINK-WRAP SOFTWARE LICENSES?
The issues raised by the campaign for making MCOs account-
able in tort are not sui generis. Indeed, a brief review of the battles
over tenants' rights, bar admissions, and shrink-wrap software li-
censes provides an interesting perspective on the costs and benefits
of providing accountability through tort. Accordingly, an abbrevi-
ated case study of each issue is provided.
A. Tenants'Rights Litigation
Affordable high quality housing for all Americans has been a
dream of housing advocates for decades. Their "solution" was
It is interesting to note that managed care executives typically argue that the cost of cov-
erage will increase dramatically if liability rights are extended, while simultaneously insisting
that they provide non-tortious care. At the same time, the plaintiffs' bar insists that liability
rights will not dramatically increase costs, while they argue that tortious care is endemic.
The internal inconsistency of each side's position remains to be explained.
68. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, And Such Small Portions: Limited Performance
Agreements and the Cost/Quality/Access Trade-Off, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 959, 973 (1998)
(modeling impact of requirement for "nothing but the best" in legal services, and conclud-
ing that limited performance agreements can enhance access to legal services for poor and
middle class); Allen R. Myerson, In Principle, a Case for More 'Sweatshops', N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
1997, § 4, at 5 ("'A policy of good jobs in principle, but no jobs in practice, might assuage
our consciences .... but it is no favor to its alleged beneficiaries.'") (quoting Professor Paul
Krugman).
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virtually self-evident in its moral and legal correctness: if landlords
were offering low-quality apartments or summarily evicting tenants,
the solution was to make them liable for doing so-Q.E.D.
Housing advocates accordingly persuaded courts and state
legislatures to adopt warranties of habitability, procedural
restrictions on evictions, and rent withholds, among other
69
measures.
The consequences of this campaign were quite predictable to
anyone with the slightest familiarity with basic microeconomics.
Over time, the low end of the housing market was effectively oblit-
erated, and the rents for the apartments that remained increased
dramatically. ° Even housing advocates are ever-so-slowly coming to
realize that their efforts have hurt those they were intended to
help:
[Tenants now have] rights to repairs; rights against evictions
without a court order; rights to trial by judge and jury, rather
than landlord friendly magistrates. What they don't have is
money to pay for the improved housing stock. [Legal Services
lawyer] Fillette ... is ambivalent about the trade-off. "Were
people better off when they were cold and paying $150 for
their own place?" he asks. "Or are they better off with heat
and plumbing, but living doubled up or paying every last cent
for rent? I don't know.",
7
'
Similar difficulties have dogged the effort to raise the standard
of the housing available to migrant workers. As one commentator
noted
[i]n the 1960's, farmers usually provided free, though some-
times substandard, housing to their workers. But Federal laws
that were enacted a decade ago to set standards for those
farmers who provide housing have instead caused many grow-
ers to stop providing lodging, concluding it is too difficult and
costly to meet the regulations. As a result, farm workers must
69. See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Ten-
ants' Voices in the Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 533, 534 n.3 1992) ("In the mid-1970s,
many jurisdictions across the United States enacted new or enhanced protections of residen-
tial tenants' legal interests in possession, habitability, rent control or conversion of rented
premises."); Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 517, 558-62 (1984).
70. See Werner Z. Hirsch, From "Food For Thought" to "Empirical Evidence" About Conse-
quences of Landlord-Tenant Laws, 69 CORNELL L. Rev. 604, 604-11 (1984); Edgar 0. Olsen, Is
Rent Control Good Social Policy?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 931, 931-35 (1991).
71. Jason DeParle, Slamming the Door, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 38.
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pay for their own shelter, a cost that often claims at least one-
third of their paychecks. That change has also forced many
farm workers to find their own transportation to work, since
they no longer live on the farm.72
Affordable high quality housing through regulation and litiga-
tion doubtless sounded like a good idea at the time to those
involved, but it turned out to be a singularly rotten strategy for
achieving that end. This case study makes clear that good inten-
tions, coupled with liability rights against vendors who fall short,
does not ensure access, let alone beneficial results. Indeed, these
elements can easily lead to disastrous consequences if they cause us
to oversimplify the underlying problem and ignore the costs of
"reform."
B. Bar Admissions Proceedings
Admission into a bar requires an applicant to satisfy certain re-
73quirements with regard to character and fitness. Those who are
turned down for admission are understandably inclined to litigate
the issue.4 The House of Delegates of the American Bar Associa-
tion recently voted to recommend that state governments adopt a
model immunity rule "to facilitate the enforcement of bar admis-
sions standards. 7 5 The rule would extend absolute immunity to bar
admissions administrators and "the agencies for which they work,"
and limited immunity to persons and organizations providing in-
formation to bar admissions administrators.76 The ABA report
argued that "[w]ithout immunity, officials may properly worry
72. Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Surveys Find Farm Worker Pay Down for 20 Years, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 1997, at Al3.
73. See Donald H. Stone, The Bar Admission Process, Gatekeeper or Big Brother: An Empirical
Study, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 331, 332-49 (1995) (compiling questions asked on state bar
applications to assess moral fitness, mental stability, and character).
74. See Paul Teich, Immunity Rule Proposed to Facilitate Enforcement of Bar Admissions Stan-
dards, SYLLABUS (American Bar Ass'n Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar),
Summer 1998, at 1, 18 ("Today, suits against bar examiners and others connected with the
admissions process are commonplace and are aggressively pursued. This is not surprising,
given the stakes for those disappointed by the process.").
75. Id. at 1.
76. Id. The ABA determined that nine states currently provide some form of civil im-
munity to those providing information regarding applicants to the Bar, and twelve states
provide some form of immunity to boards or administrators involved in the Bar admissions
process. Forty-two states currently provide immunity to state officials and witnesses involved
in lawyer disciplinary proceedings. See id. at 1, 18.
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about both personal and agency exposure to unwarranted litiga-
tion. Worry about liability exposure is potentially destructive to the
central goal of the admissions process-the maintenance of a
competent bar.",
7
7
Bar examiners face a difficult decision matrix. If they deny ad-
mission to a deserving candidate, his life is permanently blighted,
and his career prospects are destroyed. If they admit an undeserv-
ing candidate, there is a significant risk to the public and damage
to the prestige of the bar. The evidence which is available to the
bar examiners to resolve these issues leaves much to be desired;
those seeking admission are unlikely to present a full picture of
their past misdeeds, and bar examiners do not have the time or
resources to investigate every case with the care it requires. The
standard of character and fitness which applicants'are required to
satisfy is both intangible and ephemeral. Finally, because those
admitted to the bar compete with those who are current members,
bar examiners have an economic incentive to resolve any doubts
about character or fitness by denying the application.
The decisions of a bar examiner thus bear a distinct similarity to
the coverage decisions made by an MCO. Given the nature of these
decisions, the desire of those involved in making bar admissions
decisions to have some degree of immunity is perfectly under-
standable, and is, on balance, probably sound policy. Yet, it is
difficult to believe that those involved in making bar admissions
decisions are so much more virtuous than those making coverage
decisions on behalf of MCOs that the former should get sweeping
immunity (if the ABA succeeds in its lobbying campaign) and the
latter should get nothing (if ERISA is amended to eliminate the
preemption provisions). Sauce for the goose, anyone?
C. Shrink-Wrap Licenses
I recently purchased a new computer which I (or, as is more
typically the case, my children) use every day. Like most computers
one can purchase these days, it came with various pieces of pre-
loaded software. In the intervening months, I have purchased a
variety of additional software. The software works well, although
the computer occasionally freezes up and has to be rebooted. Less
frequently, the computer flashes incomprehensible error messages.
The company which sold me the computer maintains a help line,
77. Id. at 18.
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but I have to pay for a long distance call, and I typically wait on
hold for twenty or thirty minutes before I get to talk to anyone. My
experience is not unique; reports of such difficulties are common."
All of the software was secured subject to what is known in
intellectual-property circles as a shrink-wrap license agreement.
The terms of these licenses are non-negotiable, and they disclaim,
in extraordinarily fine print, any and all responsibility for
everything under the sun.79 Under limited circumstances, the
78. See, e.g., Kasey Jones, Learning Computer Setup the Hard Way, BALT. SUN, Nov. 30,
1998, at Cl. The article reports:
When people buy a computer, they want to plug it in and start writing letters or surf-
ing the Internet. Most buyers will find this won't happen. I spent the better part of a
day buying, setting up and configuring a computer for my mother. It's a wonder
more people don't hurl the things through the plate-glass windows of computer
stores.
Id.
79. The original IBM license agreement is fairly typical:
YOU SHOULD CAREFULLY READ THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDITIONS
BEFORE OPENING THIS DISKETTE(S) OR CASSETTE(S) PACKAGE. OPENING
THIS DISKETTE(S) OR CASSETTE(S) PACKAGE INDICATES YOUR
ACCEPTANCE OF THESE TERMS AND CONDITIONS. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE
WITH THEM, YOU SHOULD PROMPTLY RETURN THE PACKAGE UNOPENED;
AND YOUR MONEY WILL BE REFUNDED.
LIMITED WARRANTY
THE PROGRAM IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE
IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND
PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM
PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU (AND NOT IBM OR AN AUTHORIZED PERSONAL
COMPUTER DEALER) ASSUME THE ENTIRE COST OF ALL NECESSARY
SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
LIMITATIONS OF REMEDIES
IBM's entire liability and your exclusive remedy shall be:
1. the replacement of any diskettes(s) or cassette(s) not meeting IBM's
"Limited Warranty" and Which is returned to IBM or an authorized
IBM PERSONAL COMPUTER dealer with a copy of your receipt, or
2. if IBM or the dealer is unable to deliver a replacement diskette(s) or
cassette(s) which is free of defects in materials or workmanship, you
may terminate this Agreement by returning the program and your
money will be refunded.
IN NO EVENT WILL IBM BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING
ANY LOST PROFITS, LOST SAVINGS OR OTHER INCIDENTAL OR
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licensor will replace the software-maybe-but that is about it.
Consequential and punitive damages are not even in the realm ofS 80
possibility. Of late, courts have upheld the terms of these licenses,
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws has reached agreement on model legislation authorizing such
contracts. s' The net effect is that if the computer does something
seriously wrong, like calculating my taxes incorrectly or swallowing
an article I spent a year working on, I have no recourse. The
problem is not unique to my home computer; when Oxford Health
Plan's Information System failed, there were huge delays in
payments to providers, some patients found it difficult to obtain
needed care, and the financial position of Oxford was seriously
misstated (in possible violation of federal securities laws) .82 If the
computer at a cutting-edge hospital goes on the fritz, patients are
likely to die.
In health care, a series of standard explanations (imperfect
information, bounded rationality, and agency problems) have
historically justified a wide range of regulatory interventions.5
However, as my computer example demonstrates, these problems
are not at all unique to health care. I know little or nothing about
the technical specifications for my computer, and even if I did, that
information would be dated within a month or two. I did not even
know about the shrinkwrap license agreement when I bought the
computer, because I purchased it over the phone from a company
I knew only through its advertisements. The person on the other
end of the phone was perfectly nice, but I did not know him from
Adam. He did not really know what I needed in a computer, and I
had no reason to expect him to put my interests above those of his
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO
USES SUCH PROGRAM EVEN IF IBM OR AN AUTHORIZED IBM PERSONAL
COMPUTER DEALER HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGES, OR FOR ANY CLAIM BY ANY OTHER PARTY.
IBM License Agreement (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
80. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding arbi-
tration clause in sales agreement for computer); Pro CD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,
1450 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding terms of license packaged with computer software).
81. See Hiawatha Bray, Will One-Sided License Become Law?, BALT. SUN, Aug. 30, 1999, at
CI (noting agreement of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on
a Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act).
82. See Ron Winslow & George Anders, Management: How New Technology Was Oxford's
Nemesis, WALL ST.J., Dec. 11, 1997, at BI.
83. See Hyman, What's Wrong with a Patient Bill of Rights, supra note 20. The same expla-
nations are offered to justify the need for additional regulations when the original
regulations deliver something short of perfection. No effort is devoted to explaining why the
new regulations will not also fall short of perfection, triggering a call for still more regula-
tions. See id.
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employer. Even if everything worked fine when I took the
computer out of the box (which it did not-but that is another
story), the company I bought it from could be out of business in
two years. The computer business is a long way from the
economist's model of a market based on perfect information and
equal bargaining power, but it somehow seems to work-and
prosper.
CONCLUSION
The implicit claim of the proponents of accountable managed
care is that no one would buy the current (i.e. at least partially un-
accountable) managed care products offered by employee benefit
plans if they had any choice in the matter. Leave aside for the
moment the important question of whether consumers would be
willing to pay for legal accountability (however much or little it
costs), and instead consider the connection between accountability
and consumer demand. If you compare the guarantee offered by
Lands' End (described in Part II) with the shrinkwrap software li-
cense agreement (reproduced in Part III.C), it is quite clear that
Lands' End is far more accountable than software manufacturers,
both legally and otherwise. Microsoft has used a shrinkwrap soft-
-ware license which is essentially indistinguishable from the one
outlined in Part III.C since it opened its doors. Both Lands' End
and Microsoft have been successful, so it is not at all clear that ac-
countability as such has any necessary and automatic correlation with
consumer demand. However, the last time I checked, the Depart-
ment of Justice was not accusing Lands' End of monopolizing the
market for clothing-although they were using computers running
Microsoft Windows to prepare their pleadings for their antitrust case
against Microsoft. Microsoft had declared record profits, and had a
Price/Earnings ratio five times that of Lands' End-and Lands' End
was having problems with excess inventory.8 4 Which company has
been more successful in meeting consumer demand?
To summarize, legal accountability through the tort system is far
from the universal rule if one looks past the rhetoric of ERISA-
haters, and considers how the real world actually works. The
84. See Rekha Balu & Calmetta Y. Coleman, Retailing: Is Lands' End's Turmoil a Ghost of
Christmas '98?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1998, at B1 ("In what may be the first casualty of the
Christmas retail season, Lands' End Inc. fired two top executives-its chief executive and
vice chairman of sales-following a nine-month decline in sales growth.").
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"favored" legal position of ERISA plans and the MCOs with which
they contract turns out to be quite analogous to that of most software
manufacturers, who have unilaterally disclaimed all liability for their
products. It is particularly ironic, that the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has reached agreement on
model legislation authorizing the disclaiming of liability for com-
puter software, and the ABA is promoting similar protections for
those involved in bar admissions decisions, while a storm of protest
has led Congress to consider amending ERISA to accomplish the
opposite result for MCOs. Although legal accountability through the
tort system is obviously an important institutional arrangement, it is
not the only one-and parties routinely contract out of it or develop
alternatives when they conclude that it does not serve their mutual
best interests.
What, then, should be done? ERISA provides a partial market
test of the merits of state-based oversight of health care services
through the tort system and state regulation. The available evi-
dence indicates that the regulatory vacuum created by ERISA has
had little or no effect on quality, while lowering costs and thus in-
creasing access-facts which cast serious doubt on the merits of the
campaign to bring "accountability" to managed care.
8 
5
At the same time, the current system is far from ideal, even if
one ignores the costs of sorting out the borderlines of ERISA pre-
emption. There is no particular reason why health care coverage
should be tied to employment with a sizeable tax subsidy, nor is
there any compelling logic behind making employment-based cov-
erage the predicate for preemption of state tort remedies.
Admittedly, employers need not offer insurance at all, and the
drafters of ERISA opted for preemption with the expectation that
the elimination of inconsistent state regulatory regimes would en-
courage employers to offer such benefits.86 However, it does not
follow that one must necessarily bundle preemption with employ-
ment-based coverage, or preclude that result for non-employment
based coverage. A "check-the-box" coverage strategy (with those
opting-in bearing the full cost of their decision to purchase liability
rights) would provide a true test of the merits of tort-based ac-
countability.
85. See Hyman, What's Wrong with a Patient Bill of Rights, supra note 20.
86. SeeJ. Daniel Plants, Employer Recapture of ERISA Contributions Made by Mistake: A Fed-
eral Common Law Remedy to Prevent Unjust Enrichment, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2000, 2030-31 (1991)
(explaining how ERISA drafters did not want to raise costs unless absolutely necessary be-
cause they recognized that creation and maintenance of employee benefit programs was
voluntary; they embraced sweeping preemption in order to lower the costs associated with
inconsistent state regulatory regimes).
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I am certainly not suggesting we should dispense with regulatory
oversight entirely; there will always be the need for some level of
enforcement to prevent force, fraud, and duress in all their various
manifestations. However, it does not follow that "full" accountability,
as least as it has been defined of late, is necessary or cost-effective, or
that every bad outcome requires a regulatory response. Indeed, a
non-zero incidence of managed care 'shipwrecks' is inevitable-
and fully consistent with the correct institutional arrangements.
8 7
Assuming that a regulatory solution is in fact required, the
regulatory toolbox includes incentives, disclosure, command and
control, and performance based measures. Each of these
approaches has strengths and weaknesses; our goal should be to
pick the least worst regulatory response across all cases.
In a number of other articles, I have offered some preliminary
thoughts on possible regulatory responses to these problems. I will
not belabor these suggestions by repeating them here. Instead I
conclude, with apologies to David Letterman, with my top ten rules
for regulating managed care, in the (faint) hope it will encourage
Congress and the state legislatures to look before they leap:
10. Perfection is Unattainable, and Expensive to
Attempt
9. Shocking Cases are Unrepresentative
8. Outrage is Cheap; Health Care is Expensive
7. Symbolic Legislation is Nothing of the Sort
6. Consumer Protection is Usually Provider Protection
5. Sauce for the Goose should be Sauce for the
Gander
4. Off-Budget is Not the Same as Free
3. It All Washes Out in the Premium
2. Reform can Easily Make Things Worse
1. Structural Problems Demand Structural Solutions.
87. See Hyman, Call 911, supra note 2, at 463 ("It is no answer to point to isolated ex-
amples that have gone wrong, because there will always be such cases.").
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